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Trust and reputation models for distributed, collaborative systems have been studied and applied in
several domains, in order to stimulate cooperation while preventing selfish and malicious behaviors.
Nonetheless, such models have received less attention in the process of specifying and analyzing
formally the functionalities of the systems mentioned above. The objective of this paper is to define
a process algebraic framework for the modeling of systems that use (i) trust and reputation to gov-
ern the interactions among nodes, and (ii) communication models characterized by a high level of
adaptiveness and flexibility. Hence, we propose a formalism for verifying, through model checking
techniques, the robustness of these systems with respect to the typical attacks conducted against webs
of trust.
1 Introduction
Trust and reputation management systems [13] can improve the reliability of the interactions and the
attitude to cooperation for several types of collaborative systems, in various different domains, such as
participatory sensing systems, wireless sensor networks, peer-to-peer services, mobile ad-hoc networks,
user-centric networks, supply networks, and, last but not least, collective adaptive systems. Typically, the
models proposed for these systems rely on distributed notions of trust and reputation. More precisely,
trust management is distributed over all the nodes, which may collaborate with each others in order to
exchange and aggregate personal opinions, calculate trust scores of target nodes, and disseminate such
values [24, 28, 8, 21]. For instance, trustworthy sensor networks base their ability to collectively process
sensed data on decentralized reputation systems [9, 29, 11, 26, 22]. Nodes monitoring the behavior of
neighbor nodes in the network maintain reputation for such nodes. Hence, collaboration among nodes
with high reputation can be strengthened while malicious nodes are excluded from the community, thus
favoring activities like, e.g., intrusion detection, participatory sensing, and many more.
A web of trust can be established according to a geographical notion of group of nodes, as in crowd-
sourcing and sensor networks [9], or by following community based models, as in social networks and
P2P environments [30]. Trust derives from local, direct observations, e.g., through watchdog mecha-
nisms, quantitatively represented by scores assigned to rate the result of interactions, and from second
hand information, represented by recommendations provided to a node by the other nodes of its web of
trust. All these values are combined by the specific trust system to derive, e.g., a computational notion
of trust, which is then used as a belief level to predict either statistically or deterministically the future
behavior of the various network members.
Example 1.1 In several trust models [5, 23, 30], the trust value of peer A towards peer C through peer B
is expressed by a formula of the form:
1− (1− tBC)tAB
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where tIJ is the trust from I to J. Hence, tBC plays the role of a recommendation given to A, which is
weighted by the direct trust from A to B. Inspired by this model, in [30] a notion of club is used to
aggregate multiple self-organizing peers with common needs/features in order to improve the efficiency
of service discovery/delivery in peer-to-peer collaborative networks. Each club includes a special node,
called CDSR, with management tasks. Then, trust is generalized to express relations among clubs. For
instance, the trust from club X to club Y , reporting the result of direct experiences among peers belonging
to the two clubs, depends on the amount of positive experiences p and negative experiences n observed
by peers in X when interacting with peers in Y :
tXY (p,n) =
{
1−λ p−n if p > n
0 otherwise
(1)
where the configuration parameter λ is the probability of reliability with a single interaction. Instead,
the reputation of peer K ∈ Y as perceived by the other peers of Y is non-zero only if all the interactions
of such peers with K are positive and depends on the amount p of these direct experiences:
tY K = 1−λ p. (2)
By combining these trust values, we obtain the trust of any peer in club X towards peer K belonging
to another club Y :
tXK = 1− (1− tY K)tXY .
Example 1.2 In reputation-based sensor networks [9, 18], the local, direct trust from node I to node J
is maintained by using a watchdog mechanism in I reporting the result of each direct experience with J.
Such a feedback, which may consist of scores or, more simply, the amount of good behaviors and of mis-
behaviors observed, is then used to parameterize a trust formula relying on a standard Bayesian approach.
The calculated trust value thus represents the expectation estimating the belief level that one node has on
another node for a specific action. Second hand information can be asked from neighbor nodes, in the
form of recommended trust values reported by such nodes and scaled by a factor proportional to the trust
towards such recommending nodes.
Example 1.3 EigenTrust [14] is a trust system originally proposed for P2P file sharing systems. Peers
rate with value 1 (resp., −1) each satisfactory (resp., unsatisfactory) interaction. The local trust si j from
i to j is computed by summing up the scores of the individual transactions conducted by peer i with
peer j. Then, si j is normalized with respect to ∑ j si j in such a way to obtain a trust value ci j between 0
and 1, with ∑J cIJ = 1. These trust values are then aggregated to form a distributed notion of reputation.
The principle behind the computation of the global trust ti j from i to j is to combine the opinions of i’s
neighbors, as follows:
∑
k
cikck j
In matrix notation, given C the matrix [ci j] of all the trust values and ci the vector containing the values
ci j, then the vector ti of the values ti j is computed as CT · ci. Such a mechanism can be iterated by
aggregating the opinions of communities in cascade, i.e., by computing (CT )n · ci. For n large enough,
the result converges to the same trust vector for every peer i in the network, which thus represents the
vector of global trust values.
In PeerTrust [27], developed for distributed systems, trust towards a peer i depends on the amount of
known interactions between i and other peers, the known feedback reported by such peers, the credibility
of such peers, and an adaptive community context factor for peer i. In turn, credibility of a peer j from
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the viewpoint of a peer k depends on the recommendations about j provided by peers that previously
interacted with both k and j.
In all these examples, the trust-based selection is based on the rule ti j ≥ thi, where the trust threshold
value thi may depend on several factors influencing i, such as the dispositional trust of i, which represents
the initial willingness of the peer i to cooperate with unknown peers.
Systems such as those mentioned above are typically verified through simulation [15, 9, 30, 14] or
game theory [19], possibly leading to results validating the trust model against attacks like, e.g.:
• bad mouthing: negative feedback reported by an adversary about the behavior of a trusted agent;
• ballot stuffing: positive feedback reported by an adversary about the behavior of a malicious agent;
• collusion: attack conducted by multiple adversaries which act together with the aim of damaging
a honest agent;
• on-off: attack conducted by an adversary alternating between normal behaviors and misbehaviors.
• sybil: attack conducted by an adversary generating multiple identities with the aim of flooding the
system with fake information or misbehaviors.
• white-washing: attack conducted by a misbehaving adversary who leaves the system whenever her
reputation is compromised and then rejoins it using a different identity.
However, the lack of formal validation can be seen as a weakness, especially in such a complex frame-
work in which attacks and countermeasures depend on the flexibility and on the dynamic behavior of the
web of trust [29, 20]. Classical verification techniques, like model checking, have demonstrated their
adequacy in the validation process of systems with respect to properties like safety, reliability, security,
and performance. On the other hand, they have not received the same attention in the setting of trust and
reputation (see, e.g., [1] and the references therein). To cite few representative examples in the setting of
model checking based analysis, Reith et al. [25] verify delegation mechanisms in access control, which
can be viewed as a form of trust management, while He et al. [12] apply the same approach to the ver-
ification of chains of trust. Finally, in [3, 16] the PRISM model checker is used to estimate the tradeoff
between trust-based incentives and remuneration-based incentives in cooperative user-centric networks.
In this paper, which is inspired by [1], we present a process algebraic framework for the modeling
and, therefore, analysis of trust-based adaptive systems. With respect to [1], the proposed framework
offers different ways of modeling trust and trust-based choices, and introduces mobility and collaboration
aspects affecting the establishment and management of dynamic and adaptive webs of trust. To this aim,
a notion of environment is modeled explicitly that guides the communication and, as a consequence,
the trust relationships, among dynamic agents. Historically, starting with the Ambient Calculus [7], and
until the most recent proposals [6, 17], several process calculi have been defined that represent mobile
computation with a notion of environment. With respect to such proposals, the contribution of this paper
is a dynamic communication model relying on trust relationships.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the formal framework for the
description of an agent-based network of trust. We first define a basic calculus of sequential processes
and then we show how to model communications based on trust relations. Then, in Section 3 we show the
adequacy of such a framework by presenting two real-world examples. In Section 4, we briefly discuss
how to model check trust-based properties and, finally, in Section 5 we comment on future directions for
the proposed approach.
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2 Modeling an agent-based web of trust
All the examples shown in the previous section emphasize that the ingredients needed to feed a trust
model for distributed, adaptive systems are:
1. the set of direct experiences affecting a local notion of trust. A direct experience is expressed
quantitatively by a positive/negative score assigned to evaluate an interaction.
2. the set of groups of agents collaborating, e.g., through the exchange of recommendations, in order
to calculate a global notion of trust. It is worth observing that the composition of such groups may
be characterized by high levels of flexibility.
It is worth observing that in the following we abstract from the way in which the basic parameters
concerned with local and global notions of trust are combined to compute opinions governing the de-
cision making process, which is a task specific of the trust model adopted. Instead, we concentrate on
the specification of the behavior of agents and on the establishment of their networks of trust. For this
purpose, as we will see, in the semantics of our formal specification language we have rules describing
(i) how the basic parameters needed by the trust system are calculated and maintained, and (ii) how the
results computed by the trust system, i.e., the tIJ values, are then used to govern the trust-based interac-
tions. All the machinery taking in input the basic parameters mentioned above and returning as output
the trust values is hidden and left to the specification of the trust model.
Moreover, to simplify the presentation, unless differently specified we restrict our consideration to
systems in which one type of service is provided within the network. In order to generalize, it is sufficient
to replicate as many instances of the trust infrastructure as the number of different services modeled in
the system, because trust-based beliefs are specific to the required service.
2.1 Basic Calculus
We denote with Name the set of visible action names, ranged over by a,b, . . ., and we assume that
Name = Nameo ∪Namei, where Nameo and Namei are disjoint and represent the sets of output actions
and input actions, respectively. The fresh name τ is used to represent invisible, internal actions. We also
use α, . . . to express visible and internal actions.
The set of terms of the basic calculus for sequential processes is generated through the following
syntax:
P ::= 0 | α .P | P+P | B
where we have the constant 0 denoting the inactive process, the classical algebraic operators for prefix
and nondeterministic choice, and a constant based mechanism for expressing recursive processes. As
usual, we consider only guarded and closed process terms.
Then, the semantics of process terms is expressed in terms of labeled transition systems.
Definition 2.1 A labeled transition system (LTS) is a tuple (Q,q0,L,R), where Q is a finite set of states
(with q0 the initial one), L is a finite set of labels, and R ⊆ Q×L×Q is a finitely-branching transition
relation.
In the following, (q, l,q′)∈ R is denoted by q l−−→q′. Then, the behavior of process term P is defined
formally by the smallest LTS (Q,q0,L,R) such that Q is the set of process terms of our basic calculus
(with P representing the initial state q0), L = {τ}∪Name, and the transitions in R are obtained through
the application of the operational semantics rules of Table 1. The semantics of process term P is denoted
by [[P]].
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Table 1: Semantics rules of the basic calculus.
prefix α .P
α−−→P
choice
P1
α−−→P′1
P1+P2
α−−→P′1
P2
α−−→P′2
P1+P2
α−−→P′2
recursion B def= P
P
α−−→P′
B
α−−→P′
2.2 Interacting agents
When passing to concurrent processes, we deal with process term instances, called agents, which rep-
resent elements exhibiting the behavior associated to a given process term. This separation of concerns
between the definition of agents and of their behavioral pattern is inspired by process algebraic architec-
tural description languages (see, e.g., [2] and the references therein). The kernel of the semantics of an
agent I belonging to the behavioral pattern defined by process term P is obtained from P by replacing
each action α of P with I.α . Hence, the semantics [[I]] of agent I derives from [[P]] in the same way. Then,
we say that I is of type P, denoted I : P, and with the notation I.B we express that the local behavior of
I is given by the process term identified by the constant B. In the following, S denotes a finite set of
agents {Ii : Pi | 1≤ i≤ n} such that each agent name Ii is unique.
For notational convenience, from now on, P,P′ . . . represent the kernel of the semantics of agents,
hence P
I.α−−→P′ denotes a transition performed by agent I from its current local state represented by
process term P to the new local state represented by process term P′. Given a set S of agents forming
a system, a vector of processes expressing the local state of each agent in S represents the global state
of the system, ranged over byP,P ′, . . . . Moreover,P[P′/P] represents the substitution of P with P′ in
P . Such a notation is not ambiguous as P,P′ express the kernel of the semantics of a uniquely identified
agent inS .
As we will see, the interacting semantics ofS is given by the parallel composition of its constituting
agents, the interactions among which are regulated by communication rules that depend on community
membership and trust information. In particular, the communication model is based on the following
structures:
• A synchronization set S ⊆ Nameo×Namei, containing pairs of actions denoted syntactically by
a× b. Action a represents the output, governing counterpart of the synchronous communication,
while action b denotes the input, reacting counterpart. Hence, we assume that synchronous com-
munication is asymmetric, in the sense that one of the two agents involved governs it while the
other one reacts.
• A set of groups of agents (also said set of communities) G ⊆ 2S , such that each group represents
a set of agents that can communicate directly with each other and can share trust opinions. As
we will see, synchronous communication is possible only within the same group, while group
membership is dynamic.
• A multiset of trust opinions E with support set of type (S ,T∪{?})S , where T is a totally ordered
trust domain. Element (J,v)I expresses that after a communication between I and J, agent I has
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rated the interaction by assigning the score v (the special symbol ? means that an occurred interac-
tion has not been rated yet). We observe that E is a multiset, as agent I may be involved in several
different interactions with agent J, and some of them could be rated with the same score. As we
will see, trust opinions feed the trust system in order to compute the trust values tIJ , which in turn
govern potential synchronous communications from I to J.
Intuitively, a trust adaptive system is a set of interacting agents obeying the communication model
described above. Therefore, formally, a trust adaptive system is a tuple made of a set of agents S ,
a synchronization set S, a dynamic set of communities G , and a dynamic multiset of trust opinions
E (another parameter, i.e., the trust model, is implicit). The evolution of a trust adaptive system is
described by the semantics rules of Table 2, which formalize the parallel composition of the agents
forming the system. More precisely, these rules define the moves (deriving from autonomous actions and
synchronous communications) from configurations to configurations, where a configuration is defined by
the global state of the system, the synchronization set, the current set of interacting communities, and the
current multiset of trust opinions. Let us explain intuitively such rules.
Table 2: Semantics rules for parallel composition.
P ∈P P I.τ−−→P′
(P,S,G ,E )
I.τ−−→(P[P′/P],S,G ,E )
P ∈P G ∈ G P
I.ent(G)
−−→ P′
(P,S,G ,E )
I.τ−−→(P[P′/P],S,G [G∪{I}/G],E )
P ∈P G ∈ G ∧ I ∈ G P
I.esc(G)
−−→ P′
(P,S,G ,E )
I.τ−−→(P[P′/P],S,G [G\{I}/G],E )
P1,P2 ∈P,P1 6= P2 a×b ∈ S G ∈ G ∧ I,J ∈ G P1
I.a−−→P′1 P2
J.b−−→P′2 a ∈ H ∧ tIJ ≥ thI
(P,S,G ,E )
I.a×J.b−−→ (P[P′1/P1,P′2/P2],S,G ,E ∪{|(J,?)I|}∪{|(I,?)J|})
P1,P2 ∈P,P1 6= P2 a×b ∈ S G ∈ G ∧ I,J ∈ G P1
I.a−−→P′1 P2
J.b−−→P′2 a ∈ L ∧ tIJ < thI
(P,S,G ,E )
I.a×J.b−−→ (P[P′1/P1,P′2/P2],S,G ,E ∪{|(J,?)I|}∪{|(I,?)J|})
P1,P2 ∈P,P1 6= P2 a×b ∈ S G ∈ G ∧ I,J ∈ G P1
I.a−−→P′1 P2
J.b−−→P′2 a 6∈ {H ∪L}
(P,S,G ,E )
I.a×J.b−−→ (P[P′1/P1,P′2/P2],S,G ,E )
P ∈P G ∈ G ∧ I,J ∈ G (J,?)I ∈ E P
I.obs(v)
−−→ P′
(P,S,G ,E )
I.τ−−→(P[P′/P],S,G ,E \{|(J,?)I|}unionmulti{|(J,v)I|})
The first rule refers to the internal action τ , which is performed autonomously by each agent. Then,
we have two additional, internal actions that can be performed autonomously by each agent, which we
add to the syntax of the basic calculus:
ent(G) | esc(G)
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where G ∈ G . Such actions concern the membership to communities. In particular, action ent(G) allows
an agent to join the group G of agents (notice that G is replaced by G∪{I}, where I is the agent joining
the group). Action esc(G) allows an agent to leave the group G of agents (notice that G is replaced by
G\{I}, where I is the agent leaving the group). We point out that groups are used to dynamically confine
the sets of agents that can interact directly through synchronous communication and within which trust
based information can be shared. Hence, such sets represent the communities referenced by an agent in
a given instant of time in order to obtain trust recommendations.
The following three rules formalize the trust-based synchronous communication between two dif-
ferent agents. Based on the communication model previously described, an interaction from I, offering
output a, to J, reacting with input b, is possible if two conditions hold:
• a×b belongs to the synchronization set S;
• there exists a community of which both I and J are members.
Moreover, the communication from I to J may depend on the trust of I towards J. Inspired by the
noninterference approach to information flow analysis [10], all the actions involved in trust-based com-
munications are classified into two disjoint sets, H and L, denoting high-level and low-level actions, such
that:
• (H ∪L)⊆ Name;
• for each a×b ∈ S it holds that a ∈ H if and only if b ∈ H and a ∈ L if and only if b ∈ L.
If agent I offers output a∈H, then the potential reacting counterpart must satisfy the trust-based selection
policy based on the trust threshold thI . A typical high-level action is the service request sent by an agent
I to another agent J, which is chosen as a trusted partner. Notice that since the communication model is
asymmetric, then the trust-based condition is applied only by the agent offering the output action, which
governs the interaction. On the contrary, if agent I offers output a ∈ L, then an interaction through a
is possible only if the trust-based selection policy based on the trust threshold thI is not satisfied by the
counterpart. A typical low-level action is the denial of service delivery that is sent by an agent I to another
agent J, who previously sent a service request to I that cannot be accepted as J is not trusted enough by
I. If a 6∈ {H ∪ L}, then every interaction involving a does not rely on trust-based requirements. The
trust-based selection policy enabling a trusted interaction from I to J is tIJ ≥ thI , where tIJ is the trust of
I towards J as estimated by the trust model, which relies on the set of basic parameters collected during
the system execution. Hence, its calculation strictly depends on the chosen trust model and does not
affect the definition of the semantics for interacting processes. As discussed, tIJ may be based on several
different methods [14, 31, 30], an example of which will be given in the following. Whenever a trust-
based communication occurs, then a feedback, in the form of a score v, could be provided by each of the
two parties to rate the level of satisfaction in the interaction with the other party. To keep track of such
a possibility, terms (J,?)I and (I,?)J are added to the set E of local opinions. The former denotes that
I can rate an interaction with J, and vice versa for the latter. This evaluation may occur later on during
system execution. Hence, to report the feedback, we add to the syntax of the basic calculus the special
internal action obs(v), where v ∈ T, which allows the agent executing it to rate a trust-based interaction
previously conducted with a known agent, see the last semantic rule. Notice that the effect of such an
action is to replace the symbol ? in (J,?)I with the score v.
Well-formedness. The placeholder (J,?)I is added to the multiset E through the union operator ∪ 1.
As a consequence, it can occur in E with multiplicity 1 at most. A score assigned to an interaction
1Multiset union is defined as the multiset such that each element has the maximal multiplicity it has in either multisets.
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between I and J refers to the last of the unrated interactions among them. If other, older, unrated inter-
actions among them exist, they lose the possibility to be rated. In this way, we can model the situation
in which no feedback is reported, either because it is not needed or when the user is not stimulated to
provide trust rates. Whenever the placeholder (J,?)I is removed, an element of the form (J,v)I is added
to E through the multiset sum operator unionmulti 2, meaning that such an element may occur in E with multi-
plicity greater than 1. Notice that, if two different placeholders (J,?)I and (J′,?)I occur in E , then the
execution of transition I.obs(v) assigns score v either to J or to J′, nondeterministically. Such a situation
is avoided if the feedback is reported before the execution of a new interaction with another agent, as
typical in most trust-based systems, in which case we say that the system is well-defined.
As far as the feedback mechanism is concerned, the last rule of the semantics expresses the correct
behavior of an agent rating a real interaction, as expected by any trust system. However, such an assump-
tion is a limitation with respect to the modeling of malicious behaviors, which would require an improper
use of the action obs. With the aim of modeling fake trust reports and, therefore, false recommendations,
we add a new special internal action and the following rule for pushing fictitious opinions:
P ∈P G ∈ G ∧ I,J ∈ G P
I.fake obs(J,v)
−−−−−−−−−−−→P′
(P,S,G ,E )
I.τ−−→(P[P′/P],S,G ,E unionmulti{|(J,v)I|})
which allows any agent to rate the other agents of the community without any restriction. Going back to
the list of attacks discussed in Section 1, we observe that they can be modeled by using actions obs(v)
and fake obs(J,v). Moreover, the adaptive community-based communication policy is useful to model
sybil and white-washing attacks.
The formal semantics of interacting agents is expressed in terms of an extension of LTSs.
Definition 2.2 Given a set of trust predicates TP and a set of names N, a trust labeled transition system
(TLTS) is a tuple (Q,q0,L,R,T ) where:
• (Q,q0,L,R) is a LTS.
• T : Q→ 2TP×2N is a labeling function.
In our framework, TP is of the same type as E , whileN is the set of agent names. Then, the semantics
of a trust adaptive system described by the tuple (S ,S,G ,E ), whereS contains agents Ii, 1≤ i≤ n, S is
the synchronization set, G is the initial set of communities, and E is the initial multiset of trust opinions,
is the smallest TLTS satisfying the following conditions:
• Each global state q ∈ Q is a n-length vector of process terms modeling the local behavior of the
agents Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that the initial global state q0 is associated to the vector modeling the
initial local state of each agent.
• L = {I.τ | I ∈S }∪{I.a× J.b | I,J ∈S ∧a×b ∈ S}.
• The transitions in R and the labelings of T are obtained through the application of the operational
semantics rules of Table 2, with the labels of q0 determined by G and E .
Typically, E = /0 in q0. The assumption concerning the emptiness of E in the initial state can be changed
according to the trust model. In some case (see, e.g., [14]), in fact, a priori estimations of trust are
assigned to agents that are known to be trustworthy in a community, e.g., as they are among the founders
of the community. Hence, pre-trusted agents can be modeled by setting adequately E in the initial state.
2Multiset sum is defined as the multiset such that each element has the sum of the multiplicities it has in both multisets.
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3 Two examples
In this section, we sketch the formal modeling of two real-world systems using the trust models of [30]
and [14], in which local trust deriving from direct experiences is calculated by counting the number of
positive and negative experiences. Hence, it is sufficient to assume that the feedback reported through
action obs is either 1 or −1, respectively, thus implying T= Z.
First, let us consider a system using the trust model proposed in [30]. In the following, we illustrate
the main aspects related to the computation of the trust value tIJ without going into the details of the
algebraic specifications expressing the agents behavior. The system includes behavioral patterns for the
following categories: nodes consuming services (type Cons), nodes delivering services (type Prod), and
nodes governing clubs (type CDSR). Each club is defined as a group including one agent of type CDSR,
some consumer, and several producers offering the service that characterizes the club. For instance, given
two fixed clubs G1 and G2, the process term Cons could be defined as follows (the summation symbol ∑
is used to generalize the choice operator):
Cons def= ∑i∈{1,2} τ.send requesti.(
∑{ j∈Gi} receive serviceij.(obs(1).Cons+obs(−1).Cons)+ receive denialij.obs(−1).Cons)
where output send requesti ∈ H, input receive serviceij ∈ H, and input receive denialij ∈ L. We assume
that the synchronization set enables a communication through send requesti and a corresponding input,
say receive requesti, which is offered by every producer j belonging to Gi. Notice that the choice of
the specific producer j is nondeterministic among the agents trusted by the consumer, which proposes
the request to all the agents of group Gi. Such an interaction is not rated by the consumer. Afterwards,
through adequate synchronizations between the consumer and the responding producer, either the con-
sumer receives the service, and then rates the interaction nondeterministically, or the producer refuses
the request, and in such a case the consumer rates negatively the failure. The choice between the two
events is deterministic and based on the trust of the chosen producer towards the consumer. We point out
that the feedback, reported through action obs, is assigned to the unique producer interacting with the
consumer in a fully transparent way by virtue of the semantics rules of Table 2.
All the interactions governed by trust are based on the following encoding of the trust model of [30].
Given agent k in the club Y , Equation 2 is estimated by setting parameters p and n as follows:
p = ∑
j∈Y, j 6=k
mul((k,1) j)
where mul(e) denotes the multiplicity of term e in E . The estimation of parameter n is analogous by
replacing 1 with −1 in the definition above. On the other hand, given clubs X and Y , Equation 1 is
estimated as follows:
p = ∑
i∈X , j∈Y
mul(( j,1)i)
and similarly in the case of parameter n. Given such a model, any trust-based communication enabled in a
global state q of the TLTS representing the current system behavior, depends on the labeling T (q). Notice
that, in order to allow agents of different clubs to interact directly, the system includes ad-hoc groups of
the form {i, j} enabling the communication between i and j. On the other hand, the communication is
allowed (or not), depending on the trust ti j computed as shown above.
As another example, let us consider the encoding of EigenTrust [14] in our framework. First, observe
that the local trust from I to J is given by sIJ =mul((J,1)I)−mul((J,−1)I). Then, cIJ is obtained through
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the normalization function defined in [14]. Hence, the formula used to compute tIJ is trust
{I,J}
IJ , where:
trustSIJ = cIJ + ∑
Gs.t. I∈G
∑
K∈G,K 6∈S
cIK · trust{K}∪SKJ .
4 Model checking trust properties
The formal framework proposed in this paper can be used as a basis for the verification of distributed
trust systems. For this purpose, in [1], a model checking based approach is defined that relies on a trust
temporal logic, called TTL, which is defined for the verification of TLTS-like models and, e.g., can be
mapped to the logic UCTL [4]. Here, we specify the atomic statements of such a logic, which depend on
the representation of trust information in our calculus, while the logical and temporal operators can be
found in [1]. Similarly as for other logics merging action/state based predicates, atomic formulas include
actions labeling TLTS transitions and state-based trust predicates:
ı | w≥ k
where the domain of variable ı is the labels set L of the TLTS, k ∈ T, and w is a trust variable, which can
be equal to:
• tIJ , i.e., the trust of I towards J as computed by the trust system;
• tf IJ = f{|v |(J,v)I ∈ E |}, where function f : 2T → T is taken from a set TF of associative and
commutative functions, like, e.g., sum, min, and count, provided that T= Z.
Therefore, an atomic statement is a predicate about either the trust between two agents as computed by
the trust system, or the set of local, direct experiences between them. In this framework, trust temporal
properties can be modeled and verified, like, e.g., “Can n malicious agents provide false feedback in
order to compromise the reputation of a honest agent?”, or “Can an agent trust another agent without
sufficient, positive, direct observations?”, thus making it possible the validation of a system against the
attacks mentioned in Section 1.
5 Conclusion and future work
The formal modeling approach proposed in this paper joins the specification of distributed systems rely-
ing on an adaptive and flexible communication model with the specification of the trust model governing
the interactions among concurrent processes. These two modeling frameworks are defined separately, as
the mutual interaction between them is managed transparently at the level of the semantics of parallel
composition.
As work in progress, we mention that the multiset of trust values storing the feedback about direct
interactions can be enriched with additional information, such as, e.g., the age of each feedback. This
can be done in order to weight the contribution of an experience depending on the time elapsed from the
related interaction.
The information expressed by the trust infrastructure is employed to make the model quantitative,
in a sense, without adding numbers to the behavioral specification of the agents. Such quantitative
information can be used to solve nondeterminism in several different ways. For instance, the possibilistic
choice among alternative trust-based communications from agent i to a set of trusted agents X can be
made either probabilistic, by using as weights the trust of i towards each agent j in X , or prioritized, by
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using the same trust values, or else a combination of the two policies can be applied. Details about the
extension of the TLTS model that is obtained in such a way, which encompasses both nondeterminism
and probabilities, can be found in [1].
Finally, as future work, it would be worthwhile to parameterize (without any substantial human inter-
vention) the model checking based verification with respect to the different classes of attacks described
in Section 1.
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